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Abstract
We investigate the predictive power of hedonic models compared to that of pre-auction
estimates in the context of art auctions. We use a panel data consisting of abstract paintings
and a methodology that employs the estimates as instrumental variables in the framework of
a hedonic regression model. The results suggest that hedonic models have no better
predictive power than that of the estimates. Pre-auction estimates appear to fully account for
the available public information on works of art.
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1. Introduction 
 
In the fall of 1999, Christie’s was chosen to auction a painting by Karel Appel titled 
“Child.” Christie’s experts in Amsterdam got busy at once examining the piece. They inspected 
the condition of the canvas with a sharp eye: they looked for cracks, tears, scratches, and spots. 
They also gathered information on the history of the painting and its previous owners. Then, they 
re-examined Karel Appel’s entire body of work and considered recent trends in the art market. In 
the end, the experts concluded that “Child” would most likely fetch between $5,500 and $7,000. 
The painting thus became Lot 252 and some time later was carried by cautious hands into the 
auction room at Cornelis Schuytstraat 57. Much to everyone’s amazement it sold for close to 
$110,000. This naturally begs the question: How much do auction house experts know about the 
value of the artwork they are appraising?  
The auctioning process starts when the owner of the artwork contacts the auction house 
with the intention to sell. The artwork is examined by specialists who determine its approximate 
worth. The minimum price that the owner is willing to accept –called reserve or reservation price 
– plays a particularly interesting role here. For reasons that are obvious, the pre-auction estimate 
range has to be set above the reservation price. The reservation price is mutually agreed upon by 
the owner of the artwork and the auction house. 
In addition to the reservation price, pre-auction estimates account for many other types of  
information, such as the reputation of the painter, the location of the sale, subject matter, the 
condition of the artwork, financial market outlook, etc. It is pertinent to assume that due to the 
nature of their profession, art experts are in the best position to have knowledge of all these 
factors, and hence come with the best possible estimate of expected hammer prices. 
Most of the research on art auctions prices is concerned with the biasedness of pre-
auction estimates. Biasedness is usually measured with respect to the midpoint of the estimation 
interval. One of the questions we ask here, however, is whether pre-auction estimates make for a 
better predictor of art prices than the information already available to the public (information that 
can be summarized by a hedonic model). In order to tackle this issue we use a panel data 
consisting of abstract paintings. By choosing abstract art we seek to control for the influence of 
subject matter – a crucial determinant of art prices that is poorly understood and difficult to 
quantify. Our methodology employs the pre-auction estimates as instrumental variables, together 
with a hedonic regression model whose independent variable is the hammer price.  
The paper is organized as follows: The next section discusses our approach in the context 
of previous research. Section three discusses the determinants of art prices that are usually 
included in hedonic regression models. Section four presents the panel data and section five 
discusses the methodology and results. Section six concludes. 
 
2. Motivation and Goal 
 
A majority of studies on the informational efficiency of art auctions focus on the 
biasedness of the pre-auction estimates. The findings are mixed.  
Beggs and Graddy (1997) suggest that larger paintings - especially Impressionist Art -
tend to be underestimated by the experts. However, they also find that recently executed 
Contemporary Art pieces tend to be overestimated. Bauwens and Ginsburgh (2000) find that 
both Christie’s and Sotheby’s underestimates English silver coffee- and teapots sold between 
1976 and 1991. Chanel et al. (1996) find that the pre-auction estimates for jewellery auctions are   2
systematically below hammer prices. D’Souza and Prentice (2001) produce similar findings. 
Ekelund et al. (1998) find that in 18 years out of 20, the average price of artwork was larger than 
the average guess, although the overall mean bias of 2.7 percent suggests overestimation. The 
authors investigated Latin American Art auctions conducted by Christie’s and Sotheby’s 
between 1977 and 1996.  
Mei and Moses (2005) find that high estimates are associated with subsequent adverse 
abnormal return for periods of up to thirty years. The authors conclude that auction houses 
overestimate expensive artworks in order to reap the maximum commissions and premiums.   
Lourgand and McDaniel (1991) research Sotheby’s auctions of Americana and conclude 
that buyers and sellers participate in a fair game. Ashenfelter (1989) contends that experts’ 
estimates are truthful in the sense that they are unbiased predictors of art prices. 
There are, however, relatively few studies investigating the extent to which pre-auction 
estimates account for the available public information on artworks.  Bauwens and Ginsburgh 
(2000) contend that the experts do not take into account all available information when 
producing their estimates. Abowd and Ashenfelter (1988), however, suggest that pre-auction 
estimates are better predictors of prices than hedonic price functions. Czujack and Martins 
(2004) find that pre-auction estimates represent good predictions of the subsequent hammer 
price. Finally, Valsan and Sproule (2005) contend that the issue of an estimate’s biasedness is 
uninteresting because reservation prices constrain the low estimate in such a way that we are 
likely to observe overestimation. What really matters is the degree to which the estimates 
incorporate the already available information.  
We set out to re-examine the informational content of pre-auction estimates; the goal is to 
establish if pre-auction estimates have the same predictive power as hedonic models. We 
hypothesize they do.  We establish next a list of relevant explanatory variables to be included in 
a hedonic model; if auction house experts make an honest effort to provide a truthful estimation, 
the hedonic model should explain the variation in hammer prices no better than the pre-auction 
estimates.  
 
3. Determinants of Estimates and Prices 
 
There is a solid body of literature documenting the relationship between several 
consecrated variables and the market value of art. In general, all reputable and aspiring research 
includes the following usual suspects in a hedonic regression model
1.  
 
(i) Reputation: An artist’s reputation is probably the strongest and most obvious measurable 
determinant of pre-auction estimates and prices. Reputation is defined by style, artistic agenda, 
the folklore surrounding the life of the artist, the context of the historical period, and other 
factors, many of them unbeknownst to our inquiry. While the perception of the market can 
change over the long-run, the “rating” of artists tends to remain relatively stable over extended 
periods of time.  
 
(ii) Medium: Oil-on-canvas paintings usually command a premium over watercolors, tempera, 
and acrylics, other things equal. Oils-on-canvas are extremely sturdy: they endure the passage of 
                                                       
1 Hedonic models allow for the construction of price indexes while properly accounting for the characteristics of the product whose price is 
analyzed. Court (1939) first studied the changes in automobile prices over time in relation to performance characteristics. Gregory Chow (1967) 
used a similar approach to measure the impact of technological changes on computer prices. Ever since, research on the economics of the arts has 
adopted this methodology on a grand scale.    3
time and can withstand wide variations in humidity, temperature, and even light (to some 
degree). Oils are forgiving to hazards, such as shocks, abrasions, and vibrations. In addition oils 
have an artistic versatility not attained by any other medium. 
 
(iii) Subject Matter and/or Theme: This element represents yet another important determinant 
of estimates and prices. However, subject matter is difficult to quantify. It is not well understood 
how art lovers and investors perceive subject matter at the aggregate level. It is therefore difficult 
to understand the mechanism by which portraits and landscapes lend value to an artwork. There 
is no lack of attempts at quantifying this variable [Renneboog and Van Houtte (2002), Agnello 
(2002), D’Souza and Prentice (2001)]. Valsan (2002) has subjectively divided painting into 
landscapes, portraits, still-lifes, and compositions. Wieand et al. (1998) have even engaged, with 
a lot of courage in the unlikely exercise of counting and categorizing people, buildings, and other 
elements of motif. To complicate matters even more, some paintings occupy a special place 
within the artistic and representational mythology surrounding an artist or an historical period. 
Paul Klee is known to have incorporated letters and numbers in some of his paintings, endowing 
them with a special symbolism. 
 
(iv) Auction House: The market status and prestige of the auction house is another determinant 
of pre-auction estimates and art prices. There is a two-way relationship at play here: more 
prestigious art houses – such as Sotheby’s and Christie’s – attract more expensive and influential 
artwork. On the other hand, paintings auctioned by higher-status auction houses tend to be 
perceived as being trendier and more valuable.  
 
(v) Market: The temporal and geographic coordinates of art auctions are known to influence the 
market value of art. Hedonic price indices always include dummy variables accounting for 
period and location. The art market undergoes alternating periods of expansion and contraction, 
just like the stock market. It was bullish towards the end of the 1980s, fuelled by an expanding 
US economy and the aggressive bidding from Japanese collectors and investors. During this 
period, Impressionists and Post-Impressionist art set new price records: Van Gogh’s Sunflowers 
sold for over $40 m and Le portrait du docteur Gachet fetched $78 m. The early 1990s saw a 
major retreat in art prices. This trend reversed towards the end of the 1990s, when another bull 
market ensued, and the price of art soared again. The passage of time also left its mark on the 
geographical dimension of the art market. Paris slowly relinquished its role as the art capital of 
the world to New York City. With the ascent of abstract expressionism and pop culture, the 
skyline of Manhattan became the symbol for cultural and financial opulence. New York stands 
now as the foremost art hub of the world.  
 
(vi) Characteristics of The Buyer: One paramount factor in an art auction is the bidder. Each 
buyer walks into the auction with a unique blend of aesthetic credo, investment knowledge, 
wealth, and even prejudice. In some cases, an auction house might hold close ties to its most 
important clients, and have therefore knowledge of some of these traits. In other cases, the bidder 
may be a perfect stranger, a totally unknown variable, a wild card whose deep pockets could 
upset the bidding sequence and make tomorrow’s headlines. In any case, it is extremely difficult   4
to quantify the many characteristics of the buyer that can make a difference. This aspect is 
conspicuous by its absence from the research on art markets, and it is not difficult to guess why
2.  
 
4. The Data 
 
We use an instrumental variable approach applied to a relatively homogenous sample of 
observations. As explained earlier, we select only abstract art, because subject matter is one of 
the least quantifiable determinants of art prices. We require 150 valid observations to include a 
painter in our sample.  Our panel data consists of four major modern European artists: Vassily 
Kandinsky, Juan Miro, Paul Klee, and Karel Appel. All these four artists share a strong stylistic 
and conceptual connection. The source of data is ADEC International, a Paris-based organization 
that gathers and organizes auction data from around the world. The period covered ranges from 
1986 to 2003.  
Vassily Kandinsky was born in Moscow in 1866, and from an early age was captivated 
by music and painting. As a teenager, he taught himself to play the piano and cello. Initially, he 
studied Law and Economics, and even lectured at the Moscow Faculty of Law. Later on, he held 
academic positions in Art in Moscow, both during and after the Bolshevik Revolution, and in 
Germany, where he taught at the Bauhaus. Initially influenced by impressionists and fauvists, 
Kandinsky eventually turned to abstractionism. He founded the legendary group The Blue Rider. 
Both the Bolsheviks and Nazis despised Kandinsky’s avant-garde art. The Nazis included his 
paintings in the infamous exhibition showcasing degenerate art. A herald of pure abstraction in 
art, Kandinsky influenced abstract expressionism in the post-World War II era. He is considered 
one of the most influential modern artists. 
Paul Klee was born in Switzerland in 1879. He grew up in a family of musicians and 
became a violinist himself. Klee opted for a painting career, and subsequently joined The Blue 
Rider. Like Kandinsky, Klee taught at Bauhaus in Germany and fled Germany shortly after 
1933. In his wake, the Nazis branded his art as degenerate. Later, he became ill with a 
degenerative muscular and skin disease that eventually killed him in 1940. Klee is revered as a 
masterful colorist and one of the most remarkable abstract painters.  His art vibrates with an 
eclectic mix of influences from impressionists, fauvists, cubists, surrealists, and symbolists. 
Juan Miro was born in Barcelona in 1893, and he initially studied accounting because his 
parents wanted him to have respectable job.  Miro, however, was inexorably attracted to art and 
eventually became a painter. His art was influenced early on by impressionists and fauvists, but 
later on he turned surrealist and then abstract.  In the 1920s, he moved to Paris, where Ernest 
Hemingway bought his painting, The Farm. Miro is considered extremely original –even 
eccentric. His unique style is widely recognizable. His conceptual approach to art is now lore: 
Miro has envisioned bold new concepts, such as gas sculpture and four-dimensional painting. 
Karel Appel was born in Amsterdam in 1921, in a land rife with artistic talent. He was 
destined to carry on the tradition of great Dutch masters, from van Eyck, Rubens, Hals, 
Rembrandt, to van Dongen and Mondrian. Appel’s artistic path laid the foundation of modern 
European Abstract Expressionism. He is one of the exponents of the European group CoBra. 
Appel – a modern Holland cultural icon- is currently one of the most famous abstract painters 
still alive.  
 
                                                       
2 There are very few exceptions: a relatively recent study by Pommerehne et al. (1997) investigates the behavior of museums in the acquisitions 
of artwork and finds that they tend to overpay.   5
 
Table I. Sample statistics 










         
Number of paintings  194 427  646  1,041  2,308 
          
Average low estimate  $145.21 $189.54  $70.75 $4.09  $68.94 
Average high estimate  $203.51 $257.69  $102.86  $5.61  $96.12 
Average hammer price  $188.39 $222.01  $100.01  $4.91  $87.14 
          
Landscape-oriented  51% 55%  42%  52%  50% 
          
Oil on canvas  30% 5%  23%  62%  38% 
          
Auctioned by Sotheby’s  43% 45%  44%  28%  37% 
Auctioned by Christie’s  40% 42%  37%  40%  40% 
          
Auctioned in Paris  4% 2%  12%  8%  7% 
Auctioned in London  50% 36%  34%  24%  31% 
Auctioned in Amsterdam  0% 0%  0.3%  29%  13% 
Auctioned in New York  34% 50%  45%  14%  31% 
          
 
Sample statistics are presented in Table I. All dollar figures are calculated on a per 
square-inch basis. All figures are rounded-off to the second decimal.In total, there are 2,308 
paintings. Karel Appel accounts for almost half of the sample with 1,041 artworks. He is also the 
painter with the lowest market value of the above four, maybe because he is the only one of the 
four artists still alive. Appel’s paintings are valued at a mere $5 per square inch as compared to 
the average of $87 per square inch (entire sample), or $222 per square inch (Paul Klee). Vassily 
Kandinsky trails Klee very closely in terms of market value. Juan Miro comes in third place.  
About 40% of all artworks are oil on canvas. Karel Appel and Paul Klee stand here, yet 
again, at the two opposing ends of the spectrum. Only 5% of Klee’s paintings are oil on canvas, 
while Karel Appel boasts 62%. This difference is due in part to the different techniques that 
these two painters employed, but could also be an artifact of the tremendous market value 
differential between Klee and Appel. The higher rated the painter, the wider the range of works 
auctioned, including sketches, unfinished paintings, and even doodles. Appel probably accounts 
for more oil on canvas paintings simply because many of his sketches are not deemed worthy of 
selling in auction. By contrast, the high reputation enjoyed by the Swiss-born Klee makes every 
piece of work produced by his hand a valuable artifact
3.  
Christie’s and Sotheby’s dominate the auction market, accounting for roughly 77% of 
paintings in our sample. The remaining 20 or so auction houses in our sample account for the 
remaining 23% of artworks. The data presented above confirm yet again the leading cultural role 
played by New York City. Surprisingly, London appears to share a similar status, while Paris 
trails in a distant fourth place, slightly behind Amsterdam. New York and London appear to 
represent the largest and most famous art, and financial, centers in the world.  
 
                                                       
3 Picasso had a knack for turning all his creations into masterpieces. He is one of the most prolific artists ever; although he lived to an old age, he 
could not have produced so much unless one counts in every drawing and doodle.   6
Table II: Regression results
4 











            












            





(0.187)  -  5.311 
(0.240)   
            





 (-0.247)    1.667 
(0.045)  - 
            
Klee  57.319*** 




(-1.055)  -  -17.578 
(-0.870)  - 
            
Medium  51.738*** 




(0.136)  -  0.309 
(0.021)  - 
            
Orientation  -4.189 




(-0.248)  -  -3.731 
(-0.456)  - 
            
New York  48.588** 




(-0.364)  -  -14.631 
(-0.519)  - 
            
London  33.932* 




(-0.412)  -  -16.292 
(-0.606)  - 
            





(-0.448)  -  -16.809 
(-0.586)  - 
            
Paris  6.340 




(0.183)  -  6.501 
(0.358)  - 
            





(0.989)  -  28.900 
(1.092)  - 
            





(0.421)  -  14.116 
(0.527)  - 
            
^
Low P   - -  1.242*** 
(6.258) 
1.208*** 
(23.594)  - - 
            
^




            
R
2 0.236  0.210  0.196  0.196  0.195  0.195 
Adjusted R
2 0.226  0.200  0.195  0.195  0.195  0.195 
F-Statistic 24.919  21.409  556.682  556.682  193.735 555.858 
Sample Size  2289  2289  2289  2289  2289  2289 
            
                                                       
4 Notes:  (a) The parentheses contain the t-statistics.  (b)  “ * “ denotes significance at the .05 level, and  “ ** “ denotes significance 
at the .01 level.   7
5. Methodology and Results 
 
We want to estimate the relationship between pre-auction estimates and hammer prices, 
but are faced with a classical econometric problem. Both low and high estimates are dependent 
on a series of known factors such as artist reputation, auction house, media, date of auctioning, 
etc.; at the same time, hammer prices also reflect the same information. Hence, we cannot 
include the low and high estimate together in a hedonic regression whose dependent variable is 
the hammer price. We have therefore chosen to utilize the low and high estimates as instrumental 
variables. We first regress these two variables against what we believe constitutes a relative 
comprehensive list of explanatory variables. We then include the fitted low and high estimates as 
explanatory variables in a hedonic regression whose dependent variable is the hammer price: 
 
,, , 1 ,
11
mn
Low i o j i j k i k i
jk
PX D u ββ φ
==
=+ + + ∑∑                               (1) 
,, , 2 ,
11
mn
High i o j i j k i k i
jk
PX D u ββ φ
==
=+ + + ∑∑                               (2) 
^
, ,, 1 3 ,
1
m
Low i Hammer i o j i j k i
j
PX P u ββ β +
=
=+ + + ∑                          (3) 
^
, ,, 2 4 ,
1
m
High i Hammer i o j i j k i
j
PX P u ββ β +
=
=+ + + ∑                               (4) 
 
where:  
PLow    = Low pre-auction estimate 
PHigh    = High pre-auction estimate 
^
Low P   = Instrumental variable for the low pre-auction estimate 
^
High P   = Instrumental variable for the high pre-auction estimate 
PHammer  = Hammer price 
Xj    = Dummy variables accounting for the years 1987 – 2003 
Di    = Dummy variables accounting for artist reputation, media, auction houses, and location 
 
The results are presented in Table II. As expected, the coefficients of dummy variables 
show Karel Appel as the lowest rated painter of the group in terms of market value. Paul Klee is 
the highest rated, followed by Kandinsky, and Juan Miro in third place. Artwork executed in oil-
on-canvas tends to be significantly more expensive than other techniques. The more expensive 
pieces are sold in New York City and London. The dummy coefficients for Amsterdam and 
Paris, however, are only marginally significant (or, alternatively, the standard deviation of 
estimated coefficients tends to be rather larger). One might argue that the lack of significance in 
these estimated coefficients is due to the thinness of the market; while true, this assertion only 
reinforces the conclusion that Paris has lost its status as the premier art center of the world. 
Surprisingly, the dummy coefficients for Christie’s and Sotheby’s are statistically insignificant.  
The most important findings are revealed by inspecting the results of regressions (3) and 
(4). Model (3) is estimated in a full hedonic specification, in a semi-reduced hedonic 
specification, (after removing the yearly dummy variables) and in a reduced specification (after   8
removing all dummy variables). The reduced model, amazingly, retains the same explanatory 
power (the Wald test is not significant) as the other two versions. Statistically, the reduced model 
represents the best fit
5. The same is true of model (4). This clearly indicates that the information 
contained by the full hedonic model is wholly accounted for by the low and high pre-auction 
estimate
6. Our findings do not necessarily imply market efficiency, but we do acknowledge that 
pre-auction estimates undoubtedly have a significant and relevant informational content.  
  We are somewhat surprised by the magnitude of the estimated coefficients for the low 
and high pre-auction estimate. It appears that hammer prices are more sensitive to the variations 
in the low pre-auction estimate than to those in the high pre-auction estimate. We are reminded, 
however, that the middle of the estimation interval is seldom an unbiased estimator of hammer 
price. This is due to the presence of constraints such as the reservation prices and the need to 
maximize participation of both sellers and bidders. More specifically, the low estimate is subject 
to more constraints because the reservation price is only interfering with the inferior bound of the 
estimation interval, while leaving the superior bound unaffected [Valsan and Sproule (2005)]. 
We therefore construe these results as evidence of: a) the effort made by auction houses 
to contain the expected hammer price within the boundaries of the estimation interval, and b) the 
perception that the low estimate is constrained by the reservation price. Art buyers are probably 
considering the low estimate more relevant because it conveys more information than the high 
estimate. They are probably aware that the winning bid cannot be much lower than the low pre-
auction estimate; hence variations in the low estimate could be more closely scrutinized. In the 




The question of predicting art auctions prices is a topic that has received considerable 
attention lately. Most of the cited academic papers, however have concentrated on measuring the 
biasedness of the pre-auction estimates.  
In this paper, we have investigated the extent to which hedonic models stack up against 
pre-auction estimates in terms of predictive power. To this end we have used a relatively 
homogenous panel data consisting of abstract paintings. The artists featured in our sample – all 
four of them European – share a strong connection in terms of artistic agenda, influences, and 
historical context. The data have been analyzed using the pre-auction estimates as instrumental 
variables, in the context of a hedonic regression model. 
  In the end, the results are insightful. To the conclusions brought forward by previous 
studies, we attach our findings: we suggest that hedonic models add little or no predictive power 
above and beyond that of the pre-auction estimates. While our research does not necessarily 
represent an exercise in testing the informational efficiency of art auctions, it does strongly 
suggest that art auctions – at least in the case of four European abstract painters – are close to 
representing a fair game. It also reinforces the belief that art experts have genuine skills in 
appraising the market value of art.  
 
                                                       
5 The full hedonic model is over-specified and has multi-colinearity problems.. Citing this reason as well as other constraints we have chosen not 
to report the results of the full model.  
6 This holds true only with respect to the list of factors or determinants of art value that we put forth here. Whether our list is complete and the 
determinants are relevant is a different question altogether. In producing the hedonic model, however, we followed previous research.   9
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